Post-quantum (PQC) migration
Post-quantum migration starts with knowing what you have.
A large enough quantum computer would break the public-key cryptography that protects most connections today. The NCSC's timeline asks UK organisations to complete discovery and an initial migration plan by 2028. On OT networks, discovery is the hard part. ClaveQ starts there. For each connection it observes, it tells you whether you can trust it today, and whether it will hold once a quantum computer exists.
ClaveQ gives you the inventory and the plan. You and your vendors carry out the migration itself.
Two risks, different urgency
Not every quantum risk is equally urgent.
A quantum computer threatens cryptography in two different ways. Separate the two and a long list of findings sorts into an order of work.
Harvest now, decrypt later
An attacker who records traffic today can decrypt it once a quantum computer exists. If the data stays sensitive for years, the exposure has already begun. The risk sits in the key exchange.
Forged signatures and certificates
Nobody can forge a signature retroactively. Long-lived signing keys are a different matter. Keys such as firmware signing keys and certificate roots need replacing before a quantum computer exists, so the planning starts now.
Harvest-now-decrypt-later exposure first
On encrypted connections, ClaveQ rates confidentiality and authentication separately. It flags the ones exposed to harvest-now-decrypt-later, so you can move them to the front of the plan.
Which data to move first: Mosca's test
Security teams use a simple rule, set out by Michele Mosca of the University of Waterloo and known as Mosca's inequality. Add how long your data must stay secret (X) to how long it will take to migrate (Y). If the total is longer than the time until a quantum computer arrives (Z), that data is already exposed. Try it with your own numbers below.
Try it with your own numbers
Nobody knows Z. Pick the number your organisation plans against; the Global Risk Institute publishes a survey of expert estimates ↗.
Google has set itself a 2029 deadline to migrate to post-quantum cryptography (Google, 25 March 2026 ↗). To plan as cautiously, use the years left until then.
Enter all three numbers to see your result.
A rule of thumb for prioritising, not an assessment of your network. Nothing you enter leaves your browser. Request early access →
Source: Mosca, "Cybersecurity in an era with quantum computers: will we be ready?", IEEE Security & Privacy, 2018 ↗ · free preprint, 2015 ↗
Cited for the published method; Professor Mosca and the University of Waterloo are not affiliated with ClaveQ.
Why Z may be shorter than you assume: in March 2026, two research preprints lowered the estimated resources needed to break elliptic-curve cryptography, and Google set a 2029 timeline for its post-quantum migration.
Sources: Cain et al., arXiv preprint, 2026 ↗ · Babbush et al. (Google), arXiv preprint, 2026 ↗ · Google, 25 March 2026 ↗
Why OT is different
Code scanners and host agents cannot see inside the control network.
Some traffic has no encryption
Many industrial protocols were designed for closed networks and send data in clear text. Until someone adds protection there is nothing to migrate, so find these connections first.
Nothing can be installed
PLCs, RTUs and safety systems cannot host inventory software. Many operators will not allow active scanning on a live control network either.
Equipment outlives plans
Control equipment stays in service for decades. A connection set up today may still be running long after the NCSC's 2035 target date.
Upgrades run on vendor time
To move an industrial protocol to post-quantum cryptography, you usually need a firmware or product update from the equipment vendor.
A PQC migration plan in four steps
Discover, prioritise, migrate, re-measure.
Build the inventory
ClaveQ builds a Cryptography Bill of Materials of every connection it observes, including the ones with no encryption.
Rank what matters
Order connections by harvest-now-decrypt-later exposure and how sensitive their traffic is likely to be.
You and your vendors move to the new standards
Adopt NIST's post-quantum algorithms through firmware and product updates. The NCSC says hybrid schemes, if used, should be an interim step.
Prove the progress
Run ClaveQ again, still passively. It shows what has changed and gives you evidence of progress against the timeline.
Sources: NCSC migration timeline ↗ · NCSC: preparing for PQC ↗ · NIST PQC standards ↗
Private beta
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